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21 Introduction
Economics is an essential input ￿ many would say, the essential input ￿ for
antitrust and competition policy. Yet antitrust and competition policy are
bodies of law. They are not economics. The outcomes of particular antitrust
cases can be determined by factors that have nothing to do with economic
issues, as when a party￿ s due process rights are infringed or if access to the
legal system is denied on the ground that a plainti⁄ lacks standing.1
When it is economic arguments that determine an outcome, the economic
rationale may well be shrouded in a veil of precedent, one decision citing
another that cites another, and so on. Peeling away the veil reveals the
economic arguments that make up the judicial model of market behavior.
That model may be implicit; it may not be internally consistent; it may
evolve in a common-law way. But it is there.
In this paper I examine the economic arguments underlying U.S. antitrust
and EU competition policy decisions in four areas ￿ refusal to deal, preda-
tion, vertical contracts, and horizontal inter￿rm relations. My aim is to
outline and compare the economic models of the functioning of imperfectly
competitive markets implicit in the two approaches to setting the ground
rules for business behavior in a market economy.
2 Refusal to deal
2.1 The rules
For U.S. antitrust, monopoly power is ￿the power to control prices or exclude
competition.￿ 2 For EU competition policy, a dominant ￿rm has ￿a position
of economic strength ...which enables it to prevent e⁄ective competition
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and
ultimately of its consumers.￿ 3 U.S. antitrust and EU competition policy have
come to very nearly opposite treatments of refusal to deal by the one type of
￿rm and the other.
1Rules of standing, although unrelated to the economics of the imperfectly competi-
tive markets with which antitrust and competition policy are concerned, may re￿ ect the
economics of the legal system.
2American Tobacco Co. et al. v. U.S. 328 U.S. 781 (1946) at 811; U.S. v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. 351 U.S. 377 (1956) at 391; U.S. v. Grinnell Corp. et al. 384 U.S. 563
(1966) at 571.
3Case 27/76 United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission [1978] ECR
207 at 277; Ho⁄mann-La Roche & Co. AG v. EC Commission [1979] ECR 461 at 520.
3LinkLine4 summarizes the most recent reading of U.S. antitrust on refusal
to deal by a ￿rm with monopoly power:
As a general rule, businesses are free to choose the parties with
whom they will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of
that dealing. ...But there are rare instances in which a dominant
￿rm may incur antitrust liability for purely unilateral conduct.
There are ...limited circumstances in which a ￿rm￿ s unilateral
refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability.
For EU competition policy, in contrast, one of two recent GlaxoSmithKline
opinions indicates:5
[T]he refusal by an undertaking occupying a dominant position
on the market of a given product to meet the orders of an existing
customer constitutes abuse of that dominant position ...where,
without any objective justi￿cation, that conduct is liable to elim-
inate a trading party as a competitor....
2.2 The rationales
2.2.1 U.S.
LinkLine was a private antitrust suit by providers of retail internet access
against the vertically-integrated ￿rm over the network of which they supplied
internet access and against which they competed in the supply of internet
access to ￿nal consumers. The conduct at issue was a vertical price squeeze
(LinkLine, pp. 8￿ 9),
unilateral conduct in which a ￿rm ￿squeezes￿the pro￿t margins
of its competitors. This requires the defendant to be operating
in two markets, a wholesale (￿upstream￿ ) market and a retail
(￿downstream￿ ) market. A ￿rm with market power in the up-
stream market can squeeze its downstream competitors by raising
the wholesale price of inputs while cutting its own retail prices.
This will raise competitors￿costs (because they will have to pay
more for their inputs) and lower their revenues (because they will
have to match the dominant ￿rm￿ s low retail price).
4Paci￿c Bell Telephone Co. et al. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., et al. 555 U. S.
____ (2009) at 7￿ 9; the material quoted appears in two sequential paragraphs.
5LØlos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline (Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06) (GSK/Greece),
{ 34.
4The LinkLine opinion relies on but does not elaborate upon6 the District
Court ￿nding that AT&T had no antitrust duty to deal with its retail com-
petitors. The opinion ties the antitrust treatment of vertical price squeezes
to that of refusals to deal, writing7 ￿If AT&T had simply stopped provid-
ing [digital subscriber line] transport service to the plainti⁄s, it would not
have run afoul of the Sherman Act. Under these circumstances, AT&T was
not required to o⁄er this service at the wholesale prices the plainti⁄s would
have preferred￿and8 ￿if AT&T can bankrupt the plainti⁄s by refusing to
deal altogether, the plainti⁄s must demonstrate why the law prevents AT&T
from putting them out of business by pricing them out of the market.￿But
the opinion bases the antitrust treatment of vertical price squeezes on the
antitrust treatments of refusal to deal and of predatory pricing rather than
on discussion of the impact of vertical price squeezes on market performance.
The 2004 Trinko opinion9 is one of the precedents upon which LinkLine
relied. Trinko revolved around a complaint of constructive refusal to deal,10
￿that Verizon had ￿lled rivals￿orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an
anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers from becoming or remaining
customers of competitive [local exchange carriers], thus impeding the com-
petitive [local exchange carriers￿ ] ability to enter and compete in the market
for local telephone service.￿The Trinko opinion emphasizes11 that to ￿nd
a monopolization violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires ￿nd-
ing both the possession of monopoly power and ￿the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,￿
and further that
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity
to charge monopoly prices￿ at least for a short period￿ is what
6There is, however, the remark in footnote 2 that ￿Even aside from the District Court￿ s
reasoning ...it seems quite unlikely that AT&T would have an antitrust duty to deal with
the plainti⁄s. Such a duty requires a showing of monopoly power, but￿ as the FCC
has recognized ...￿ the market for high-speed Internet service is now quite competitive;
[digital subscriber line] providers face sti⁄ competition from cable companies and wireless
and satellite providers.￿
7LinkLine, p. 11.
8LinkLine, pp. 16￿ 17.
9Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law O¢ ces of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
10540 U.S. 398 at 404.
11540 U.S. 398 at 407, quoting U.S. v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563 at 570-571.
5attracts ￿business acumen￿in the ￿rst place; it induces risk tak-
ing that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard
the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will
not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.
Economic pro￿t provides the wherewithal to ￿nance innovation. For
which sectors of the economy ￿monopoly￿￿rms (in the antitrust sense) have
an incentive to invest in, or a comparative advantage in, innovation, if any,
remains an open question.12
The Trinko court continues13
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastruc-
ture that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.
Compelling such ￿rms to share the source of their advantage is in
some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since
it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to
invest in those economically bene￿cial facilities. Enforced sharing
also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identify-
ing the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing￿ a role
for which they are ill-suited. Moreover, compelling negotiation
between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion. Thus, as a general matter, the Sherman Act ￿does not
restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.￿
The Trinko court later14 remarks that ￿Antitrust analysis must always
be attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at
issue.￿ With this admonition in mind, it is worth noting that innovation
was not obviously a feature in either Trinko or LinkLine, and that in both
cases the infrastructure of the vertically-integrated ￿rm was not a product of
competitive risk-taking, but inherited from a regulatory-regime ancestor.15
It is not self-evident that an obligation to supply an essential resource
on reasonable terms would of necessity involve day-to-day supervision by
courts, any more than does the prohibition of collusion. A ￿rm that colludes
exposes itself to antitrust liability; if prosecuted, the legal system must de-
termine whether or not collusion has taken place. Under a rule that treated
12See Martin (2010, chapter 14) for a survey of the literature.
13540 U.S. 398 at 407-408.
14540 U.S. 398 at 411.
15540 U.S. 398 at 415￿ 416.
6strategically high prices for an essential resource as a monopolization o⁄ense,
a ￿rm that set such prices would expose itself to antitrust liability; if prose-
cuted, the legal system would have to determine whether or not prices were
set strategically to exclude equally-e¢ cient ￿rms. In this regard, see Bausch
& Lomb:16
Speci￿cally, we are asked to direct the inclusion of require-
ments that Soft-Lite ￿le ￿with the district court a written instru-
ment providing that it will sell its product, without discrimina-
tion, to any person o⁄ering to pay cash therefor.￿
The Sherman Act is intended to prevent unreasonable re-
straints of commerce. The Clayton amendment ...outlawed agree-
ments with customers which restricted the customer from dealing
with the products of a competitor of the seller. Persons injured by
unlawful restraints may recover threefold damages. The federal
courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin violations. Congress has
been liberal in enacting remedies to enforce the anti-monopoly
statutes. But in no instance has it indicated an intention to in-
terfere with ordinary commercial practices. In a business, such
as Soft-Lite, which deals in a specialty of a luxury or near-luxury
character, the right to select its customers may well be the most
essential factor in the maintenance of the highest standards of
service. We are, as the District Court apparently was, loath to
deny to Soft-Lite this privilege of selection. ...We have no reason
to doubt that Soft-Lite will conform meticulously to the require-
ments of the decree. When it is shown to the trial court that it
has not done so will be an appropriate time for the Government
to urge this addition to the decree.
Along with the role of economic pro￿t in creating incentives for resource
allocation in a market system, the Trinko court emphasizes the disadvantages
that an expansive application of antitrust￿ s monopolization prohibition would
entail:17
Against the slight bene￿ts of antitrust intervention here, we must
weigh a realistic assessment of its costs. Under the best of cir-
cumstances, applying the requirements of § 2 ￿can be di¢ cult￿
because ￿the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legiti-
mate competition, are myriad.￿...Mistaken inferences and the
16U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. et al. 321 U.S. 707 (1944) at 728￿ 729.
17540 U.S. 398 at 414.
7resulting false condemnations ￿are especially costly, because they
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.￿
...The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion
of § 2 liability.
Trinko￿ s vision of the market mechanism is one in which economic pro￿t
￿ more than a normal, risk-adjusted rate of return on investment ￿ is an
incentive for innovation and investment that improves market performance.
Section 2 prohibits a ￿rm with market power from investing resources to
exclude equally-e¢ cient rivals. But antitrust is imperfect; when in doubt, it
is better to err by permitting strategic behavior that is pro￿table because
it excludes than to err by condemning conduct that is pro￿table because it
better serves consumers.18
If the supplier of an essential input is vertically integrated, the opportu-
nity for mischievous single-￿rm conduct lies not in its horizontal relationship
with downstream competitors but in its vertical relation with the down-
stream ￿rms that must be its customers. The position of Trinko is that one
reason antitrust errs, if it must err, in the direction of accepting the strategic
unilateral exercise of market power that worsens market performance by an
upstream ￿rm is to avoid facilitating the joint exercise of market power in
the downstream market.19
Colgate For the most part, the Colgate20 rule, that ￿In the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
18Two Supreme Court decisions, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 342 U.S. 143
(1951) and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 472 U.S. 582 (1985), are
sometimes cited as involving unilateral refusal of access to an essential resource. The
Trinko Court puts aside the essential facilities doctrine on legal grounds rather than eco-
nomic analysis of the impact of the practice on market performance argument (540 U.S.
398 at 410￿ 411), noting as well that the Supreme Court ￿never recognized such a doctrine.￿
What some refer to as essential facilities cases involving joint action are distinguished (foot-
note 3) ) on the grounds that joint action ￿presents greater anticompetitive concerns￿than
single-￿rm action and ￿is amenable to a remedy ...requiring that the outsider be granted
nondiscriminatory admission to the club.￿
19The sense in which an antitrust prohibition of vertical price squeezes would compel
negotiation between a vertically-integrated upstream supplier (which must in any case
come in contact with its nonintegrated downstream customers) and downstream rivals
is not clear. The antitrust prohibition of predatory pricing does not appear to compel
negotiation between ￿rms that operate at the same horizontal level.
20U.S. v. Colgate & Co. 250 U.S. 300 (1919) at 307. The italicized words are emphasized
by the Supreme Court in Lorain Journal (342 U.S. 143 (1951) at 155, as they are here.
8whom he will deal,￿is rooted in the common law, not in consideration of
the implications of the rule for market performance.21 The Supreme Court
Trinko opinion contents itself with referring to ￿the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business.￿
The Colgate District Court22 makes an economic argument to explain a
manufacturer￿ s interest in, and the public bene￿t from, resale price mainte-
nance:23
The successful prosecution of [Colgate]￿ s business, and the con-
tinued use of its soap by the public, depend upon its ability to
￿nd and maintain a market for its output. Price cutting would
almost inevitably result in reducing the defendant￿ s business in
a given community to only those engaged in that practice, and
deprive it of the patronage of the great body of wholesalers and
retailers engaged in what they believed to be a fair and legit-
imate conduct of their business. It by no means follows that,
in the end, the public would be bene￿ted, as the price cutter
could easily raise prices after the demoralization caused by his
conduct had been brought about, and pro￿t individually by so
doing. What the public is interested in is that only reasonable
and fair prices shall be charged for what it buys, and it is not
claimed that the defendant￿ s manner of conducting its business
has otherwise resulted.
For the District Court, however, the key fact that made Colgate￿ s resale price
maintenance program acceptable under the antitrust laws was that it was a
unilateral program, not arrived jointly with distributors. Under the Colgate
program, distributors were not bound to maintain resale prices; they simply
knew that if they did not, they would ￿incur [Colgate￿ s] displeasure.￿Because
it was a unilateral program, it fell under the common law rule, and did not
o⁄end Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The District Court cites a number of authorities in support of the propo-
sition that a manufacturer ￿may control and dispose of his own property￿
21Colgate itself involved the nature of contracts between a nonintegrated upstream man-
ufacturer and its distributors, and so lacked the vertical integration aspects central to
LinkLine and Trinko. Whatever the implications of the Colgate rule for market perfor-
mance, it cannot be taken from granted that they are the same in the two di⁄erent sets
of circumstances.
22U.S. v. Colgate & Co. 253 F. 522 (1918) at 527.
23That ￿the price cutter could easily raise prices after the demoralization caused by his
conduct ...and pro￿t individually by so doing￿ indicates that for the Colgate District
Court, a price-cutting retailer would be able to recoup pro￿ts lost during a price-cutting
phase.
9provided he does so ￿in a lawful and bona ￿de manner.￿Most of these au-
thorities in turn reach back to the common law for support.
An 1895 decision,24 however, one that in contrast to Colgate, Trinko, and
LinkLine involved horizontal combination, made the economic argument that
the exercise of market power would bring about its own demise:25
Each one of the defendants had an undoubted right to determine
for himself the price at which he would sell the goods he made,
and he certainly does not lose that right by deciding to sell them
at the same price at which a dozen or so of his competitors sell
the goods which they make. Collectively the defendants owe no
duty to any one of their competitors to regulate the price they ￿x
for their goods so as not to interfere with the price he ￿xes for his
own. And it is di¢ cult to see how the public is injuriously a⁄ected
by any such agreement between the combining manufacturers. If
the price so ￿xed is the normal and usual one theretofore prevail-
ing, certainly the public cannot complain; still less if the price be
reduced. ...If, on the contrary, the combining defendants ￿x the
price too high, they restrain their own trade only; the public will
buy the goods it wants, not from them, but from their competitors.
The 1913 State of Washington Fisher Flouring Mills decision makes a
similar argument in a context that did not involve joint action:26
In the absence of a monopoly ...a contract ￿xing retail prices to
the consumer cannot have an e⁄ect appreciably inimical to the
public interest, because it cannot ￿x prices at an unreasonably
high ￿gure without defeating its own purpose by either signally
failing to maintain the ￿xed price, or putting the individual man-
ufacturer out of business. In either case, it fails to restrict com-
petition. Either the consumers will not buy the product at the
price ￿xed, or, if they do, the high price will stimulate competi-
tion in production and the price will inevitably fall. The given
manufacturer will thus be compelled to accept one or the other
alternative. He must either ￿x the price to cover only a rea-
sonable pro￿t, or he must retire from business, and this, for the
24Dueber Watch-Case Co. v. Howard Watch Co., 66 Fed. 637.
2566 Fed. 637 at 644; emphasis added.
26Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson 76 Wash. 649 (1913) at 660￿ 661. Fisher
Flouring Mills is cited in A&P v. Cream of Wheat Co. 224 F. 566 (1915), which in turn
is cited by the Colgate District Court.
10simple reason that, in the absence of a monopoly, either actual
or potential, of the entire supply, the natural conditions of trade
will defeat any attempted restriction of competition.
These long-ago analyses complement Trinko￿ s view of the role of economic
pro￿t in a market system. Economic pro￿t is an incentive for resource real-
location. If a ￿rm has the power to control prices, and exercises that control
to earn more than a normal rate of return, by that very action it triggers
reactions by consumers and by rivals that erode its power.
Of course, for antitrust, monopoly power is ￿the power to control prices or
exclude competition.￿If a ￿rm that raises price also has the power to exclude
equally-e¢ cient competitors, consumers will have no competitors to which
to turn; economic pro￿t can persist inde￿nitely.27
2.2.2 EU
The issue in GSK/Greece was GlaxoSmithKline￿ s limitation of pharmaceuti-
cal supplies to Greek distributors who wished to take advantage of arbitrage
opportunities created by regulatory di⁄erences among the Member States ￿
taking delivery of pharmaceuticals at relatively low, regulated, Greek prices
and exporting them to higher-price parts of the Union.
Among the reasons for the general rule stated by the Court of Justice in
GSK/Greece and quoted above is that ({ 37) ￿parallel imports enjoy a certain
amount of protection in Community law because they encourage trade and
help reinforce competition.￿
Additionally, the Court refers to the 1974 Commercial Solvents decision,28
which revolved around the decision of a U.S. multinational to cut o⁄supplies
of an essential ingredient to an established customer with which, absent the
refusal to deal, its Italian subsidiary would have been in competition. In
that decision, and referring to the EC Treaty￿ s requirement that the Com-
munity establish ￿a system ensuring that competition in the common market
is not distorted,￿the Court wrote29 that ￿an undertaking being in a domi-
nant position as regards the production of raw material and therefore able
to control the supply to manufacturers of derivatives, cannot, just because
it decides to start manufacturing these derivatives (in competition with its
former customers) act in such a way as to eliminate their competition ....
27Thus the Fisher Flouring Mills Court quali￿ed its sanguine view of the market as a
self-correcting mechanism as holding ￿in the absence of a monopoly.￿
28Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents
v Commission [1974] ECR 223.
29Commercial Solvents, { 25.
11Since such conduct is contrary to the objectives expressed in Article 3(f)
of the Treaty ... ...an undertaking which has a dominant position in the
market in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw
material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer,
which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks elimi-
nating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant
position ...￿ .
The GSK/Greece Court also cites the 1978 Chiquita Banana decision,30
one aspect of which was the situation of a Danish distributor of bananas
that had been cut o⁄ by United Brands after distributing another brand of
bananas. The relationship between United Brands and the distributor was
strictly vertical ￿ United Brands was not itself a distributor ￿ but the
Court once again held that refusal to supply was ({ 183) ￿inconsistent with
the objectives laid down in Article 3(f) of the Treaty, ...since the refusal to
sell would limit markets to the prejudice of consumers and would amount
to discrimination which might in the end eliminate a trading party from the
relevant market.￿The Court further wrote ({{ 192￿ 193) that the termina-
tion of one dealer would have a deterrent e⁄ect on other dealers that would
interfere with their independence, strengthen United￿ s dominant position,
and ￿have a serious adverse e⁄ect on competition on the relevant ... market
by only allowing ￿rms dependant upon the dominant undertaking to stay in
business.￿
The economic argument of Commercial Solvents evinces a commitment
to prevent the elimination of equally-e¢ cient competitors ￿ abuse lay in
eliminating a consumer by cutting o⁄ its supplies of an essential input, not
by competition on the merits. One aim of Chiquita Banana, to maintain
the independence of distributors, ￿and this independence implies the right
to give preference to competitors￿goods,￿serves to lower the cost of entry,
which should improve market performance (whether actual entry occurs or
not).
While upholding the generally abusive nature of refusal to deal by a dom-
inant ￿rm, the Court of Justice grasped that prohibiting a limitation of sup-
plies might lead a value-maximizing manufacturer to cut o⁄supplies entirely
to a low-price market:31
Furthermore, in the light of the Treaty objectives to protect con-
30Case 27/76 United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission [1978] ECR
207.
31GSK/Greece, { 68. For another situation involving similar issues, see the Commission￿ s
1977 Distillers decision (OJ L 50/16 22 February 1978), which prohibited a dual price
structure for UK and continental markets and for a time led The Distillers Company
Limited to stop marketing its major distilled beverages in the UK.
12sumers by means of undistorted competition and the integration
of national markets, the Community rules on competition are
also incapable of being interpreted in such a way that, in order
to defend its own commercial interests, the only choice left for a
pharmaceuticals company in a dominant position is not to place
its medicines on the market at all in a Member State where the
prices of those products are set at a relatively low level.
Consumer welfare is foremost in this argument.
The GSK/Greece Court concluded that a dominant ￿rm abuses its po-
sition if it denies distributors ordinary supplies, and returned the matter to
the national court for determination whether the orders in question were or
were not ordinary.
For EU competition policy, refusal to deal is abuse of a dominant position
if it blocks innovation. This appears from the 1995 Magill decision,32 which
concerned the refusal of the three leading television broadcasters to Ireland
to allow publication of television listings by an independent ￿rm that sought
to market a combined listing ({ 54): ￿The [broadcasters￿ ] refusal to provide
basic information by relying on national copyright provisions thus prevented
the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television
programmes, which the appellants did not o⁄er and for which there was
a potential consumer demand.￿Despite the fact that the broadcasters held
intellectual property rights over their own schedules, ￿Such refusal constitutes
an abuse under ... the Treaty.￿ 33
The economic model apparent in these applications of EU competition
policy to dominant ￿rm behavior recognizes that dominant ￿rms in imper-
fectly competitive markets can behave strategically to raise the cost of entry
and frustrate innovation. For EU competition policy, the exercise of mar-
ket power need not sow the seeds of its own destruction. The aim of the
anti-abuse provisions of EU competition policy is to channel the competitive
32Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR
I-743.
33It appears from the later Bronner decision (Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH &
Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint
Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH
& Co. KG. [1998] ECR I-7791) that refusal is not abuse if there are economically reason-
able terms on which the refused competitor could reach the market. Further, from IMS
Health (IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG and NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG Case C-
418/01 Judgment of 29 April 2004, { 49), refusal ￿may be regarded as abusive only where
the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself essentially to
duplicating the goods or services already o⁄ered on the secondary market by the owner
of the intellectual property right, but intends to produce new goods or services ...and for
which there is a potential consumer demand.￿Here too the focus is on innovation.
13abilities of dominant ￿rms into competition on the merits, and away from




In Weyerhaeuser,34 and citing Brooke Group,35 Justice Thomas outlines the
rules for U.S. antitrust treatment of predatory pricing:
￿First, a plainti⁄seeking to establish competitive injury resulting
from a rival￿ s low prices must prove that the prices complained of
are below an appropriate measure of its rival￿ s costs.￿... Second,
a plainti⁄ must demonstrate that ￿the competitor had . . . a
dangerous probabilit[y] of recouping its investment in below-cost
prices.￿
As stated by the Court of Justice in its 2009 Wanadoo decision, the EU
requirements for ￿nding predatory abuse of a dominant position are36
[F]irst, ... prices below average variable costs must be considered
prima facie abusive inasmuch as, in applying such prices, an un-
dertaking in a dominant position is presumed to pursue no other
economic objective save that of eliminating its competitors. Sec-
ondly, prices below average total costs but above average variable
costs are to be considered abusive only where they are ￿xed in the




Justice Thomas explains the economic logic behind the antitrust treatment
of predation37
34Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. 549 U. S. 312 (2007)
at 318￿ 319.
35509 U.S. 209 (1993) at 222, 224.
36Case C-202/07 P France TØlØcom SA v Commission (2009), { 109.
37549 U. S. 312 (2007) at 319￿ 320, internal citations omitted.
14The ￿rst prong of the test￿ requiring that prices be below cost￿
is necessary because ￿[a]s a general rule, the exclusionary e⁄ect
of prices above a relevant measure of cost either re￿ ects the lower
cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competi-
tion on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial
tribunal to control.￿... We were particularly wary of allowing
recovery for above-cost price cutting because allowing such claims
could, perversely, ￿chil[l] legitimate price cutting,￿which directly
bene￿ts consumers. ... Thus, we speci￿cally declined to allow
plainti⁄s to recover for above-cost price cutting, concluding that
￿discouraging a price cut and . . . depriving consumers of the
bene￿ts of lower prices . . . does not constitute sound antitrust
policy.￿...
The resource allocation strengths of a market system depend on ￿rms
making decisions that equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. For the
leading empirical case, constant returns to scale,38 marginal cost equals av-
erage cost. From an economic point of view, pricing above average cost does
not exclude equally-e¢ cient rivals, hence is not predatory exclusion. The
unwillingness to condemn above-unit-cost price cutting leaves unspeci￿ed
the antitrust treatment of prices that are between average cost and average
variable cost.
Continuing, Justice Thomas writes:
The second prong of the Brooke Group test￿ requiring that there
be a dangerous probability of recoupment of losses￿ is necessary
because, without a dangerous probability of recoupment, it is
highly unlikely that a ￿rm would engage in predatory pricing. As
the Court explained in Matsushita, a ￿rm engaged in a predatory-
pricing scheme makes an investment￿ the losses su⁄ered plus the
pro￿ts that would have been realized absent the scheme￿ at the
initial, below-cost-selling phase. . . . For that investment to be
rational, a ￿rm must reasonably expect to recoup in the long run
at least its original investment with supracompetitive pro￿ts. . .
. Without such a reasonable expectation, a rational ￿rm would
not willingly su⁄er de￿nite, short-run losses.
The economic basis of the recoupment test is that in a market system,
￿rms act to maximize pro￿t, or, in a dynamic perspective, value. If a value-
38Martin (2004).
15maximizing ￿rm could not reasonably expect to recoup pro￿ts lost during a
predatory phase, it would not pursue a predatory strategy.39
3.2.2 EU
The rationale for the ￿rst element of the EU rule is as stated in Wanadoo,
that pricing below average variable cost by a dominant ￿rm justi￿es the
presumption that the objective is to eliminate competitors. This rule can
be traced to AKZO Chemie,40 where one also ￿nds an economic argument
to support the second element of the EU rule ({ 72):41
Moreover, prices below average total costs, that is to say, ￿xed
costs plus variable costs, but above average variable costs, must
be regarded as abusive if they are determined as part of a plan
for eliminating a competitor. Such prices can drive from the
market undertakings which are perhaps as e¢ cient as the dom-
inant undertaking but which, because of their smaller ￿nancial
resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged
against them.
In proceedings before the Court of First Instance, Wanadoo pleaded that
the Commission needed to demonstrate a possibility of recoupment in order
to support a ￿nding of abuse of a dominant position:42
[Wanadoo] submits that the recoupment of losses is entirely sepa-
rate from the test of predation and the Commission must provide
evidence of it. It takes the view that, if an undertaking in a
dominant position cannot reasonably expect to reduce long-term
competition with a view to recouping its losses, in particular be-
cause it is easy to enter the market in question, it is not rational
for that undertaking to engage in a policy of predatory pricing. In
that situation, the policy of low prices applied by the undertaking
must be explained otherwise than by a strategy of predation.
39See Matsushita (475 U.S. 574 at 588￿ 589, also cited by Justice Thomas): ￿A predatory
pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. Any agreement to price below the competitive
level requires the conspirators to forgo pro￿ts that free competition would o⁄er them. The
forgone pro￿ts may be considered an investment in the future. For the investment to be
rational, the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form
of later monopoly pro￿ts, more than the losses su⁄ered.￿
40AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission 1991 ECR I-3359, { 71.
41For case studies of predation against rivals with limited ￿nancial resources, see Gabel
(1969), Genesove and Mullin (1997). For a formal treatment, see Poitevin (1989).
42T 340/03 France TØlØcom v Commission [2007] ECR II 107, { 219.
16The Court of First Instance, and later the European Court, rejected this
approach, referring to the Tetra Pak II statement that43 ￿It must be possible
to penalize predatory pricing whenever there is a risk that competitors will
be eliminated.￿
The economic basis of the U.S. rule on recoupment is that ￿rms are
rational value-maximizers, predation is unlikely44 and unlikely to succeed.
If the likelihood of recoupment cannot be shown, one may infer that prices
have not been set below an appropriate measure of unit cost; evidence to
the contrary either has been misinterpreted or, if not, indicates that the ￿rm
setting the prices has made a mistake.
The economic basis of the EU rule on recoupment is that ￿rms are ratio-
nal value-maximizers; if it has been shown that prices have been set below
average variable cost, the ￿rm setting the prices must have done so as part
of a value-maximizing strategy; hence no separate proof of recoupment is
in order. Further, prices set below average cost are an abuse if part of an
exclusionary scheme.45
A rational value-maximizing ￿rm may set a price below current average
variable cost if learning-by-doing is present, or if a product is introduced
to a market. Properly interpreted, the EU rule would not condemn such
pricing as an abuse, since such prices would not be set as part of a scheme
to eliminate competitors.
4 Vertical Contracts
Vertical contracts, at least those that generate legal briefs, typically involve
a larger manufacturer and smaller, perhaps more numerous, distributors. As
such, they inhabit an economic and legal half-way house between monopoliza-
tion/dominance and collusion/cooperation, between Section 2 and Section 1,
43Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission 1996 ECR I-5951 { 44
(Tetra Pak II).
44But see Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) at 121,
footnote omitted: ￿As the foregoing discussion makes plain ...predatory pricing is an
anticompetitive practice forbidden by the antitrust laws. While ￿rms may engage in the
practice only infrequently, there is ample evidence suggesting that the practice does occur.￿
45Legal responsibilities, of course, often depend upon an evaluation of intent. See Justice
Holmes in dissent in Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919), at 626￿ 627: ￿[T]he word intent
as vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion means no more than knowledge at the time
of the act that the consequences said to be intended will ensue. Even less than that
will satisfy the general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may have to pay
damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might be hanged, if at the time of his act
he knew facts from which common experience showed that the consequences would follow,
whether he individually could foresee them or not.￿
17between Article 102 and Article 101.
4.1 U.S.
For U.S. antitrust, the passage from the 1967 Schwinn decision46 to the 1977
Continental TV decision47 was central to the transition from wholesale ap-
plication of the principle of competition to explicit, rule of reason, evaluation
of the impact of business practices on market performance. In Schwinn, the
Supreme Court permitted territorial and other contractual restrictions on
distributors if Schwinn retained title to bicycles until they reached the ￿nal
consumer and condemned them per se if distributors purchased bicycles for
resale. Despite the statement of principle that48 ￿we must look to the speci￿cs
of the challenged practices and their impact upon the marketplace in order
to make a judgment as to whether the restraint is or is not ￿ reasonable￿ ,￿the
basis of the decision was the common law condemnation of restrictions on
alienation:49 ￿Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and con￿ne areas or persons with whom an
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over
it. ...Such restraints are so obviously destructive of competition that their
mere existence is enough. If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his
product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over
its destiny or the conditions of its resale.￿
Ten years later, the Continental TV Court reversed Schwinn￿ s per se
rule, noting ￿the Court in Schwinn did not distinguish among the challenged
restrictions on the basis of their individual potential for intrabrand harm or
interbrand bene￿t. ...The pivotal factor was the passage of title: All restric-
tions were held to be per se illegal where title had passed, and all were evalu-
ated and sustained under the rule of reason where it had not.￿ 50 The Conti-
nental TV majority held that51 ￿departure from the rule-of-reason standard
must be based upon demonstrable economic e⁄ect rather than ...upon for-
malistic line drawing￿and returned vertical restraints to the rule of reason
category.
In footnote 19 of Continental TV, the Supreme Court gives priority to
46U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. et al. 388 U.S. 365.
47Continental T.V., Inc., et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36.
48388 U.S. 365 at 374.
49388 U.S. 365 at 379, internal citations and footnote omitted, emphasis added.
50The Continental TV majority interprets Schwinn￿ s sale/no sale distinction as an ￿ef-
fort to accommodate the perceived intrabrand harm and interbrand bene￿t of vertical
restrictions;￿see pages 52￿ 54. This reading of Schwinn is not convincing.
51433 U.S. 36 at 58￿ 59.
18interbrand competition over intrabrand competition (emphasis added):
Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufac-
turers of the same generic product ￿ television sets in this case
￿ and is the primary concern of antitrust law.
This view no prior basis in antitrust (Grimes, 2002),52;53 but has echoed
through later decisions.54
The economic vision implicit in the U.S. antitrust treatment of manufac-
turer-distributor contracts is that vertical restrictions simultaneously reduce
intrabrand competition and increase interbrand competition,55 and so fall
under the rule of reason. In principle, the rule of reason might permit or
condemn any particular set of restraints, depending on their net impact on
market performance. But interbrand competition is the primary concern of
U.S. antitrust.
52But see the 1913 State of Washington Fisher Flouring Mills decision (76 Wash. 649
at 668￿ 669): ￿Finally, it seems to us an economic fallacy to assume that the competition
which, in the absence of monopoly, bene￿ts the public, is competition between rival re-
tailers. The true competition is between rival articles, a competition in excellence, which
can never be maintained if, through the per￿dy of the retailer who cuts prices for his
own ulterior purposes, the manufacturer is forced to compete in prices with goods of his
own production, while the retailer recoups his losses on the cut price by the sale of other
articles at, or above their reasonable price.￿
53Footnote 19 continues with a brief economic argument about the relation between
intrabrand and interbrand competition. It may be correct that ￿The degree of intrabrand
competition is wholly independent of the level of interbrand competition confronting the
manufacturer,￿but the reverse is not the case: the premise of the tradeo⁄that the majority
identi￿es in the decision is that by restricting intrabrand competition, a manufacturer can
make his brand more competitive vis-￿-vis the brands of other manufacturers. If so ￿
and the economic literature does not justify such a general conclusion ￿ this explains
why restrictions on intrabrand competition are privately pro￿table for the manufacturer
that imposes them. It does not demonstrate that restrictions on intrabrand competition
bene￿t consumers or improve market performance. It may also be correct that ￿But
when interbrand competition exists ...it provides a signi￿cant check on the exploitation
of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a di⁄erent
brand of the same product.￿To the extent that restrictions on intrabrand competition aim
to promote product di⁄erentiation, however, interbrand substitutability will be reduced.
There is also the Hart and Tirole (1990) argument that in the presence of holdup problems,
vertical restraints may be a prerequisite for a manufacturer to fully exploit its potential
market power.
54Among which Business Electronics v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717 (1988), Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997), and Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
55433 U.S. 36 at 51.
194.2 EU
In the 1966 Consten and Grundig decision, ECJ found abuse in a manufac-
turer￿ s reliance on a contract granting an exclusive territory to a distributor
to block ￿parallel imports￿from one member state to another:56
The principle of freedom of competition concerns the various
stages and manifestations of competition. Although competition
between producers is generally more noticeable than that between
distributors of the same make, it does not thereby follow that
an agreement tending to restrict the latter kind of competition
should escape the prohibition of Article [101](1) merely because
it might increase the former.
In Metro I,57 the Court was willing to rely on competition between dif-
ferent systems of distribution to get good market performance in the con-
sumer electronics sector: ￿[T]he structure of the market does not preclude
the existence of a variety of channels of distribution adapted to the peculiar
characteristics of the various producers and the requirements of the various
consumers.￿
From early days, EU competition policy has condemned restrictions on
parallel trade as restrictive of competition:58 ￿by its very nature, a clause pro-
hibiting exports constitutes a restriction on competition, ...since the agreed
purpose of the contracting parties is the endeavour to isolate a part of the
market.￿But the 1998 Javico decision,59 which arose out of a contractual
breakdown between a French perfume manufacturer and a distributor autho-
rized to distribute in three Eastern European countries,60 makes clear that
whether or not a restrictive contract is abusive depends on its impact on
market performance ({ 17):61 ￿even an agreement imposing absolute terri-
torial protection may escape the prohibition laid down in Article [101] if it
56[1966] ECR 299 at 342. The same unwillingness to accept restrictions on one type
of competition to promote another appears in the 1972 U.S. Topco decision, mentioned
below.
57Metro SB Gro￿ m￿rkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission Case 27/76 judgment of 25
October 1977 (1977) ECR 1875, { 20.
58Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission [1978] E.C.R. 131,
{ 7. See also Case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission [1975] ECR 1367,
Case 226/84 British Leyland v Commission [1986] ECR 3263, Joined cases 96-102, 104,
105, 108 and 110/82 IAZ International Belgium and others v Commission [1983] ECR
3369, and the auto distribution cases.
59Case C 306/96 Javico v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA [1998] ECR I 1983.
60For the purpose of EU competition policy, the distribution scheme restricted compe-
tition, but it received an exemption from the Commission.
61The same point is made in Case 5/69 V￿lk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, p. 302.
20a⁄ects the market only insigni￿cantly, regard being had to the weak position
of the persons concerned on the market in the products in question￿and ({
19)
In the case of agreements of this kind, stipulations of the type
mentioned in the question must be construed not as being in-
tended to exclude parallel imports and marketing of the contrac-
tual product within the Community but as being designed to
enable the producer to penetrate a market outside the Commu-
nity by supplying a su¢ cient quantity of contractual products to
that market. ...
In principle, therefore, antitrust and competition policy both view verti-
cal restraints through the lens of impact on market performance. In applica-
tion, antitrust gives a priority to promotion of interbrand competition that
competition policy does not, and competition policy gives weight to market
integration considerations that antitrust does not.
5 Horizontal relations: collusion, tacit collu-
sion, cooperation
5.1 U.S.
The ancient rule that treats collusion as the supreme evil of antitrust can be
traced to Judge Taft￿ s 1898 aversion to setting sail on a sea of doubt62
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mis-
taking, as we conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the
rules for determining the unreasonableness of restraints of trade,
have set sail on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to
say, in respect to contracts which have no other purpose ...than
the mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint of com-
petition is in the public interest, and how much is not.
The manifest danger in the administration of justice according
to so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard would seem
to be a strong reason against adopting it.
In 1904, the U.S. Supreme Court made competition the bedrock of U.S.
antitrust:63
6285 F. 271 at 283￿ 284, emphasis added.
63193 U.S. 197 at 337; emphasis added.
21Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a
wise and wholesome rule for trade and commerce is an economic
question which this court need not consider or determine. Un-
doubtedly, there are those who think that the general business
interests and prosperity of the country will be best promoted if
the rule of competition is not applied. But there are others
who believe that such a rule is more necessary in these days of
enormous wealth than it ever was in any former period in our his-
tory. Be all this as it may, Congress has, in e⁄ect, recognized the
rule of free competition by declaring illegal every combination or
conspiracy in restraint of interstate and international commerce.
From this bedrock rose a sweeping edi￿ce of decisions that condemned all
departures from independent price-setting, such as Trenton Potteries￿192764
The aim and result of every price-￿xing agreement, if e⁄ective,
is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to ￿x
prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to
control the market and to ￿x arbitrary and unreasonable prices,
and Socony-Vacuum￿ s 194065;66
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged
in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-
￿xing group were in no position to control the market, to the
extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would
be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The Act
places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital
part of our economy against any degree of interference. Congress
has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular
price-￿xing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive.
As late as 1972, on the way to condemning exclusive territories that
were part of a grocery store joint purchasing agency, the Supreme Court was
unwilling to trade o⁄less competition in one part of the economy to get more
competition in another:67
64U.S. v. Trenton Potteries 273 U.S. 392 at 397.
65U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. et al. 310 U.S. 150 at 221.
66Between the two decisions, of course, came Appalachian Coals, Inc., et al. v. U.S. 288
U.S. 344 (1933). It remains to be seen whether Appalachian Coals is the exception it is
usually made out to be, or a bellwether.
67405 U.S. 596 at 610 (Topco), emphasis added.
22[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how
small, is the freedom to compete ￿ to assert with vigor, imagi-
nation, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be
foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because cer-
tain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might
promote greater competition in a more important sector of the
economy.
Judge Bork￿ s 1986 Rothery Storage decision takes a much less expansive
view of the scope of the per se rule. Against the background of exclusive
dealing arrangements between a national moving line and its local agents, he
wrote:68
At one time ... the Supreme Court stated in Topco and Sealy
that the rule for all horizontal restraints was one of per se ille-
gality. The di¢ culty was that such a rule could not be enforced
consistently because it would have meant the outlawing of very
normal agreements ... that obviously contributed to economic
e¢ ciency. The alternative formulation was that of Judge Taft
in Addyston Pipe & Steel: a naked horizontal restraint, one that
does not accompany a contract integration, can have no purpose
other than restricting output and raising prices, and so is ille-
gal per se; an ancillary horizontal restraint, one that is part of
an integration of the economic activities of the parties and ap-
pears capable of enhancing the group￿ s e¢ ciency, is to be judged
according to its purpose and e⁄ect.
It was vertical relations that were at issue in Rothery Storage. The 2006
Dagher decision,69 in contrast, involved horizontal cooperation e⁄ected by
means of a joint venture. Two major oil companies, competitors on all ver-
tical levels of the world petroleum industry, formed a joint venture70 ￿to
consolidate their operations in the western United States, thereby ending
competition between the two companies in the domestic re￿ning and mar-
keting of gasoline.￿The Supreme Court a¢ rmed a District Court refusal to
￿nd the arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act:71
68792 F.2d 210 at 229. Sealy (388 U.S. 350 (1967)), involved retail price maintenance
and exclusive territories. In Rothery, the Appeals Court viewed the restrictions as ancillary
to legitimate contracts and therefore permissible under Section 1.
69Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
70547 U.S. 1 at 4.
71547 U.S. 1 at 5￿ 6.
23Price-￿xing agreements between two or more competitors, other-
wise known as horizontal price-￿xing agreements, fall into the
category of arrangements that are per se unlawful. ...These
cases do not present such an agreement, however, because Texaco
and Shell Oil did not compete with one another in the relevant
market￿ namely, the sale of gasoline to service stations in the
western United States￿ but instead participated in that market
jointly through their investments in [the joint venture].
With Dagher, what had been a prohibition of ￿Any combination which
tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity￿has be-
come72 ￿the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of
the Sherman Act￿ . The Supreme Court￿ s 2010 American Needle73 empha-
sized that for U.S. antitrust, the applicability, or lack of it, of the § 1 hinged
on74 ￿a functional consideration of how the parties ... actually operate.￿If
the arrangement joins independent centers of decisionmaking, a rule of rea-
son inquiry is called for, otherwise not.75 It remains possible to challenge
the formation of anticompetitive joint ventures.76 Whether that way will
be followed remains to be seen, but the way remains open for a return to
the old common law rule that would permit combinations falling short of
monopoly.77
5.2 EU
Against a background like that of GSK/Greece, the ECJ￿ s 2009 GSK/Spain
decision78 involved the treatment under what is now Article 10179 of agree-
ments between GSK and its Spanish distributors, agreements that provided
72547 U.S, 1 at 8.
73American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League et al. 24 May 2010 560 U. S.
____ (2010).
74Slip. op., p. 6.
75In footnote 9, the Court wrote that there was ￿no need to pass upon￿the argument
that Section 1 did not apply to fully-integrated joint ventures, since, functionally, NFLP
was not such a venture. The Dagher rule survives to another day.
76547 U.S, 1 at 7.
77See, in this regard, Justice Holmes￿distinction (Northern Securities Company v. U.S.
193 U.S. 197 (1904) at 404) between contracts in restraint of trade and combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade). For a reminder where this approach can lead, see the
Friedmann (1942) and Lewis (1943) discussions of Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co.,
Ltd v. Veitch and Another (1942). I All E.R. 142.
78GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. EC Commission (Joined Cases C 501/06 P,
C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C 519/06 P) 6 October 2009 (Glaxo Wellcome). See similarly
Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers [2008] ECR I-0000.
79Of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
24for a lower wholesale price of pharmaceuticals to be distributed in Spain and
a higher wholesale price of pharmaceuticals destined for export. The eco-
nomic standard applied in GSK/Spain hinged on the word ￿or￿in the Article
101 prohibition of ￿agreements ... which may a⁄ect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or e⁄ect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the internal market....￿The Court reiter-
ated ({ 55) ￿the anti-competitive object and e⁄ect of an agreement are not
cumulative but alternative conditions￿and that ￿it is not necessary to ex-
amine the e⁄ects of an agreement once its anti-competitive object has been
established.￿ The rationale appears in an earlier decision,80 that ￿certain
forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very na-
ture, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.￿
Thus ({ 63) ￿it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like
other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article [101] EC aims to
protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the
structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.￿
Much hinges, of course, on what is meant by preservation of a competitive
market structure. If preservation of a competitive market structure means
(as it seems to in Chiquita Banana) condemning behavior that arti￿cially
raises entry cost, then much economic thought suggests that preserving a
competitive market structure will also serve consumer welfare. If preservation
of a competitive market structure means keeping less-e¢ cient ￿rms on the
market, the opposite is true.
It should be kept in mind that the issue here is circumstances under which
agreements are incompatible with the internal market under Article 101(1).
Article 101(3) allows the Commission to set aside the Article 101(1) prohi-
bition for agreements which, in speci￿ed ways, improve market performance.
The Commission has availed itself of this prerogative, in individual cases and
via a series of Guidelines, Notices, and Block Exemptions. In this way, EU
competition policy has at one and the same time been more open than U.S.
antitrust to possible e¢ ciency gains from cooperation but also alert to the
possibility that cooperation might blend seamlessly into e⁄ective collusion.
6 Parting Thoughts
What models of the workings of imperfectly competitive markets emerge
from U.S. antitrust and EU competition policy decisions? U.S. antitrust
recognizes that single ￿rms may invest resources to obtain or maintain posi-
tions of market power. It is skeptical to the possibility that such investments
80Case C 8/08 T Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I 0000, { 29.
25may be pro￿table for their exclusionary e⁄ect. As long as actual competitors
and potential entrants do not confront strategic costs of expansion or entry,
economic pro￿t plays a benign role, sending signals that guide socially bene￿-
cial resource reallocations. Hard-core collusion to set prices remains beyond
the pale. Cooperation in other dimensions is increasingly viewed through
rose-colored glasses.
EU competition policy is distinguished by the special responsibility of
dominant ￿rms not to distort competition on the common market. This
does not reach the level of a general condemnation of economic pro￿t;81
rather, it translates into an insistence that dominant ￿rms may maintain
their positions by competition on the merits, not otherwise.82 With regard to
dominant ￿rm behavior and inter￿rm cooperation, the EU￿ s commitment to
market integration leads it to apply competition policy in ways that promote
good market behavior.
One thing is certain. Screaming Lord Sutch once asked ￿Why is there
only one Monopolies Commission?￿For long after 1890, there was only one
supreme tribunal interpreting competition law. That is no longer the case.
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